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During the 1980s and 1990s, important legislative, judicial, and diplomatic initiatives 
emanated from the United States, strengthening patent and copyright enforcement systems both 
domestically and in the broader world economy.  The political influences that led to these 
changes are interesting in their own right.  Even more interesting, however, is the fact that 
governmental emphasis on patent systems increased in the wake of impressive new findings 
from economic studies showing that patents played a surprisingly minor role in well-established 
corporations' decisions to invest in research, development, and technological innovation.  The 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, important legislative, judicial, and diplomatic initiatives 
emanated from the United States, strengthening patent and copyright enforcement systems both 
domestically and in the broader world economy.  The political influences that led to these 
changes are interesting in their own right.
1  Even more interesting, however, is the fact that 
governmental emphasis on patent systems increased in the wake of impressive new findings 
from economic studies showing that patents played a surprisingly minor role in well-established 
corporations' decisions to invest in research, development, and technological innovation.  The 
opposing movements of the political and behavioral science currents will be a principal theme of 
this article. 
 
2. The Turbulent Early History 
 
Governments' policies toward patents on inventions and copyright for artistic works have 
been marked by appreciable fluctuations over the course of history.  At the dawn of the 17th 
century, patents and copyrights were components of the feudal system in Western Europe.
2  
Sovereigns awarded exclusive privileges to pursue a mechanical trade, publish books or music, 
and present theatrical performances to selected individuals -- usually but not always those with 
close connections to the noble courts and often favorites of the court.  The privilege system was 
attacked under the banner of the Enlightenment, first during the reign of James I in England 
(1603-25) and then with the 1779 French Revolution and the eastward spread of anti-feudal 
policies under Napoleon.  It was replaced by patents and copyrights made available to the middle 
classes through more transparent procedures, but limited in the time span over which they were 
applicable.  In the New World, granting to authors and inventors exclusive rights to their 
                                            
1.  For a contribution with a similar focus and some similar conclusions, see William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (AIE-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies: 
2004), which in turn is derived from Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(Harvard University Press: 2003). 
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writings and discoveries for limited times was enshrined in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. 
Constitution.  
  The period between the 1770s and 1840s, when patent and copyright laws spread rapidly, 
was followed, at least in Europe (but less so in the United States), by an "anti-patent" movement.  
In England, reforms following publication of Charles Dickens' spoof, "A Poor Man's Tale of a 
Patent," simplified the processes by which patents were issued, imposed stricter examination of 
patent applications, and allowed abrogation of exclusive rights in cases of demonstrated abuse.  
The Swiss legislature repeatedly rejected proposals to enact patent laws, and in the Netherlands, 
existing patent laws were repealed in 1869, to be reenacted only in 1910.  The severe recession 
of 1873 triggered more favorable attitudes toward patents, and in 1887, even conservative 
Switzerland found it prudent to pass a patent law.   
  In the United States the patent system enjoyed widespread and persistent political 
support, among others, from Abraham Lincoln, who had personally patented an invention of his 
creation and who as an attorney in Illinois had litigated patent disputes.  Inventors such as 
Thomas A. Edison and Alexander Graham Bell were idolized.  Extensions over time of the Bell 
telephone monopoly and a cartel originally based upon the Edison electric lamp patents were 
sustained in a series of Supreme Court tests, reinforcing an earlier decision allowing a patent 
holder unilaterally to stipulate the minimum prices at which its licensees could sell their products 
and ignoring evidence that the patent-holder had pursued numerous parallel actions that in effect 
cartelized the relevant industry.
3  During the 1960s the Department of Justice sought to overturn 
the still-binding precedent, but was unsuccessful.
4   
                                                                                                                                             
  2.  For authoritative histories, see Fritz Machlup and Edith Tilton Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History, vol. 10 (May 1950), pp. 1-29; Machlup, An Economic Review 
of the Patent System, Study No. 15 of the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights (1958); and, putting copyright privileges in a more democratic light, Hansjörg Pohlmann, Die 
Frühgeschichte des musikalischen Urheberrechts (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1962). 
3.  Bement & Son v. National Harrow Company, 186 U.S. 70 (1902), followed by U.S. v. General Electric Co., 272 
U.S. 476 (1926).  The rationale was that since holding a valid patent allowed the patent holder to exclude others and 
hence to monopolize sale of the relevant products, licensing restraints that preserved the patent holder's monopoly 
reward were acceptable. 
4.  See e.g. U.S. v. Huck Mfg. Co. et al., 382 U.S. 197 (1965), in which an attempt to overturn earlier Bement and 
General Electric precedents failed with a 4-4 division of Supreme Court justices. 
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  In most respects, however, the tide turned again during the Great Depression of the 
1930s.  Growing hostility toward monopoly was precipitated by the belief that downward price 
rigidities enforced by monopolistic sellers (as well as by cartels authorized under President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's National Recovery Administration) inhibited recovery from the 
depression.  Threats to national security posed by patent-based cartels in tungsten carbide 
machine tools and synthetic rubber raised questions about the abuse of patent grants.  So also did 
the wide-ranging investigations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, which showed 
inter alia how industries such as glass container-making had been thoroughly regimented through 
collusive control of patents by the Hartford-Empire Company.  At an American Economic 
Association symposium reviewing the TNEC's findings, later Nobel Laureate George Stigler 
found the Hartford-Empire story "an eloquent example of an evil demanding correction" and 
concluded flatly that "The case for limitation of restrictive [patent] licensing is surely 
irrefutable."
5
  Hartford-Empire was an early target of the reinvigorated antitrust enforcement paralleling 
the TNEC hearings.  Its extensive patent agreements with other bottle-making technology 
providers and users were found to violate the antitrust laws.  To remedy the situation, a federal 
district court judge ordered inter alia that Hartford-Empire and companies with which it had 
joined forces be required to license all their bottle-making machinery patents -- after a Supreme 
Court intervention declaring royalty-free licensing to be confiscatory, at "reasonable" (i.e., 
modest) royalty rates.
6  After a subsequent Supreme Court decision stated that district court 
judges could exercise "judicial discretion" in formulating remedies for patent-based antitrust law 
violations, royalty-free licensing of General Electric's electric lamp patents was imposed.
7
  The Hartford-Empire and General Electric cases were followed by numerous antitrust 
settlements in which compulsory licensing of patents was ordered to remedy monopolistic 
situations where patents played a significant role.  Between 1941 and the late 1950s, compulsory 
licensing decrees had been issued in settlement of more than 100 antitrust complaints, covering 
inter alia AT&T's transistor and other telecommunications apparatus patents, IBM's computer 
                                            
5.  George J. Stigler, "The Extent and Bases of Monopoly," American Economic Review, vol. 32 Supplement (June 
1942), p. 14.  At the time, Stigler was teaching at the University of Minnesota. 
 6.  U.S. v. Hartford-Empire Co. et al., 46 F. Supp. 541 (1942), 323 U.S. 386 (1944), 324 U.S. 570 (1944). 
 7.  U.S. v. General Electric Co. et al., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844 (1953).   
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patents, and DuPont's nylon and other synthetic fiber patents.  The cumulative number of patents 
affected is estimated to have been between 40,000 and 50,000.
8  Although the pace abated after 
1960, additional decrees covered the roughly one thousand patents in Xerox's plain-paper 
copying machine portfolio
9 and several pharmaceutical products.  Many European nations had 
until recently laws allowing compulsory licensing of patents, notably, in cases where an 
invention was not actually produced within the patent-issuing nation.  However, the cumulative 
number of compulsory licensing orders has seldom exceeded a dozen in the typical large 
European nation -- a far cry from the tens of thousands of patents covered by U.S. antitrust 
decrees.  Most of the U.S. compulsory licensing decrees were entered by mutual consent rather 
than as the result of fully contested litigation.  Only the General Electric decree imposed royalty-
free licensing through a contested court order, but several others, including the AT&T order of 
1956, entailed royalty-free licensing by mutual consent.
10
 
3. Economic Impact Studies 
 
The 1956 decree ordering the compulsory licensing of roughly 8,600 AT&T patents and 
the nearly simultaneous decree affecting IBM patents inspired particularly intense public 
scrutiny.  The Wall Street Journal observed in an editorial:
11
 
So it may turn out that these are dangerous victories the Government boasts about.  The 
settlements in these cases indicate a belief that everybody's patents should be everybody 
else's.  But this is a philosophy that strikes at incentive; new ideas and new inventions 
may be lost.  Such Government victories may turn out to be far more costly for the nation 
than for the companies. 
 
                                            
8.  Marcus A. Hollabaugh and Robert Wright, Compulsory Licensing under Antitrust Judgments, staff report of the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Washington: 1960), pp. 
2-5. 
 9.  In the Matter of Xerox Corporation, decision and order, 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975). 
10.  U.S. v. Western Electric, Inc., and the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., CCH 1956 Trade Cases, Para. 
68,246 (1956). 
11.  "Dangerous Victory," January 27, 1956, p. 6. 
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Shortly thereafter eight colleagues and I formed a group to meet the requirement for a 
"topic report" in a Harvard Business School course taught by Georges F. Doriot, president of the 
first modern American high-technology venture capital group, the American Research and 
Development Corporation.  We decided to study the incentive effects of compulsory licensing 
decrees.  We read widely in the relevant literature (aided by studies commissioned under an 
ongoing Senate Judiciary Committee investigation); fanned out to interview 22 American 
corporations, many of whom had entered compulsory licensing decrees; received mail 
questionnaires from 69 companies holding 45,500 patents; and conducted an extensive statistical 
analysis of patenting trends.  The results, privately-published in two book editions,
12  w e r e  
profoundly surprising to us.  We discovered that with rare exceptions, whether or not well-
established corporations could expect patent protection was typically unimportant in their 
decisions to invest in research and the development of new products and processes.  "Of far 
greater everyday importance," we concluded, "are reward structures related to the necessity of 
retaining market positions, of attaining production more efficient than competitors', of securing 
the corporation through diversification against disastrous product obsolescence, and of gaining 
short-term advantages which can be exploited by advertising and well-developed sales 
channels."
13  To be sure, there were exceptions -- notably, situations in which firms were making 
risky investments into fields where they had little technical or marketing experience, and 
arguably (since our sample included few startup companies) for small new enterprises seeking a 
competitive foothold against well-entrenched rivals.
14  We found also from interviews, mail 
survey responses, and statistical analyses that prior compulsory licensing decrees had little or no 
unfavorable impact on research and development decisions, although they had led to less 
patenting of the inventions actually made and hence greater reliance on secrecy, especially on 
(concealable) process as distinguished from readily observed product inventions.  This finding 
was supported in a later statistical study, conducted when company R&D spending data first 
became publicly available, which showed that the companies subjected to compulsory licensing 
                                            
12.  F. M. Scherer, S. E. Herzstein, Alex Dreyfoos, William Whitney, Otto Bachmann, Paul Pesek, Charles Scott, 
Thomas Kelly, and James J. Galvin, Patents and the Corporation: A Report on Industrial Technology under 
Changing Public Policy (2nd ed.: Boston: 1959).  The first edition was published in 1958. 
13.  Ibid., p. 149. 
14.  The ambiguous situation of startup companies was characterized by the reaction of Professor Doriot when we 
told him about our contemplated research:  "Hell, patents are simply instruments with which big companies 
bludgeon my startups." 
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decrees spent more on R&D relative to their sales on average than unimpacted companies of 
comparable size in the same fields of technology.
15
  Unaware of our study, economists at Cambridge and Oxford Universities undertook 
similar research on how the absence of patent protection would affect the R&D behavior of 
British companies.  They found that across all industries covered, the weighted average reduction 
in R&D expenditures if no patent protection could be obtained -- a condition more drastic than 
compulsory licensing with reasonable royalties -- would be eight percent.
16  However, in 
pharmaceuticals, a negative impact of 64 percent was predicted.  Similar disparities between the 
incentive effect of patents in pharmaceuticals and other high-technology industries were revealed 
through particularly careful interviews with U.S. companies by Edwin Mansfield and 
colleagues.
17
  Many surveys have shown that the expectation of patent protection is much more 
important to investment in pharmaceutical R&D than in most industries.  Drug R&D comes 
closest to what economists call the generation of knowledge as a pure public good.  Most of the 
expenditure is directed toward finding molecules that might have interesting therapeutic action in 
human beings and then, through costly clinical trials, ascertaining that the target molecule is 
really effective and safe.
18  Absent patents, once that evidence has been amassed, it might be 
available for any and all would-be generic imitators to exploit.  All that may be needed for the 
free-rider (or more accurately, cheap rider) is to spend a sum on process engineering tiny relative 
to the amounts spent on discovery and testing, whereupon a competing molecule can be 
marketed (if regulatory rules permit).  However, further research added a caveat to this 
conclusion and clarified the role of what came to be known as "first mover" advantages as a 
barrier to rapid new product imitation and hence as a substitute for patent protection.  Comparing 
                                            
15.  F. M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, New York University Monograph Series 
in Finance and Economics 1977-2 (1977), pp. 67-75. 
16.  C. T. Taylor and Z. A. Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System (Cambridge University Press: 
1973), p. 199. 
17.  Mansfield, "Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study," Management Science, vol. 32 (February 1986), pp. 
173-181; and Edwin Mansfield et al., "Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study," Economic Journal, vol. 91 
(December 1981), pp. 907-918. 
18.  For a survey, see F. M. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy (HarperCollins: 1996), pp. 357-
362. 
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side-by-side two pharmaceutical entities, one unpatentable and one patented, Bond and Lean 
found that the erosion of the pioneer's price premium and market share was as slow for the 
unpatented product as for the patented product.
19  The reason, it became clear, was that being the 
first successfully to market a consumer product affixes in the mind of decision-makers an image 
of superiority and reliability that is hard for latecomers to surmount, whether the product is 
patented or not.  However, it should be noted that the Bond and Lean study focused on products 
developed during the late 1950s, when regulatory strictures were more lax and the research and 
testing costs required to market a successful new drug entailed only about $1 million.  By the late 
1990s, the comparable costs had mounted to hundreds of millions of dollars, while the costs of 
engineering imitative generic products rose much less. 
  A major step toward confirming the role hoped-for patent protection plays in R&D 
decisions was taken by four prominent economists at Yale University.
20  They obtained elaborate 
survey responses from 650 U.S. R&D managers.  One set of questions, emulating earlier 
inquiries for a smaller sample by Mansfield, asked how much R&D, measured relative to the 
first mover's R&D, would be needed to duplicate the first mover's innovation.  For major 
patented new products, the average fraction was roughly 85 percent (weighting category ranges 
by response rates); for major unpatented products, 65 percent.  Thus, patent protection raised 
imitation costs, but even without it, imitators could not simply "free-ride" on the innovator's 
work.  The Yale group also asked respondents to rank on a scale of 1 ("not at all effective") to 7 
("very effective") the extent to which various instruments protected the competitive advantages 
from new and improved products and processes.  The average scores across 130 industrial lines 
on the effectiveness of various means to reap the economic benefits of new and improved 





                                            
19.  Ronald S. Bond and David Lean, Sales, Promotion, and Product Differentiation in Two Prescription Drug 
Markets. Federal Trade Commission Staff report (Washington: February 1977).  See also William D. Robinson and 
Claes Fornell, "Sources of Market Pioneer Advantages in Consumer Goods Industries," Journal of Marketing 
Research, vol. 22 (August 1985), pp. 305-317. 
20.  Richard C. Levin, Alvin Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney Winter, "Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1987, no. 3), pp. 783-820. 
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 Patents  to  prevent  duplication    4.33 
  Patents to secure royalty income    3.75 
 Secrecy     3.57 
  Being first with an innovation    5.41 
  Moving quickly down learning curves  5.09 
  Superior sales or service efforts    5.59 
 
Having patent protection was found on average to be relatively unimportant compared to 
three other ways of gaining first mover advantages.  For new and improved processes, it was 
even less important on average, while, not surprisingly, secrecy was ranked more highly than 
either of the patent measures.  There were, to be sure, exceptions.  Among 77 industry groups 
with three or more responses, the pharmaceuticals industry ranked duplication-preventing patents 
as the most important means of holding off imitative competition, second in average score only 
to the agricultural chemicals field (with environmental effect test regulations similar to those 
imposed for pharmaceutical efficacy and safety). 
  Generally similar responses were obtained in an even larger Carnegie-Mellon University 
survey during the late 1990s to which more than a thousand industrial laboratory managers 
responded.
21  Using a somewhat different scale than the Yale survey, respondents were on asked 
what percentage of their product innovations various means of protecting profits were effective.  
Patent protection had the second lowest average score of 34.83 percent, undercut only by "other 
legal" mechanisms.  Lead time was viewed as the most important means, with an average score 
of 52.76 percent.  Secrecy received much higher weight than in the Yale survey, with a 51 
percent average, followed by complementary manufacturing capabilities (46 percent), 
complementary sales and service efforts (43 percent).  As in the Yale survey, patents received an 
unusually high score in pharmaceuticals, second only among 34 broad industry categories to 
television and radio equipment (a puzzling result for the late 1990s, by which time Asian 
manufacturers dominated the field). 
  Important lessons emerge from these queries addressed to real-world managers.  First, 
alternative barriers to rapid imitation -- the substantial R&D costs imitators have to incur, lags in 
recognizing opportunities, image and cost advantages accruing to the first mover, and the like 
leave a substantial class of cases in which would-be innovators can anticipate revenue gains 
                                            
21.  Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and J. Walsh, "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:  Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," working paper, February 2000. 
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exceeding their innovation and production costs even when patent protection is totally absent.  
Second, given that non-patent stimuli to innovation exist, established firms are driven to 
undertake their own innovation efforts for fear of being overtaken by more aggressive rivals.  
This is the Schumpeterian "creative destruction" effect.
22  Third, patent protection does 
substantially enhance profit expectations in some industries -- e.g., much more so in industries 
with characteristics such as pharmaceuticals than in semiconductors or computers.  Fourth, there 
may be complex and conflicting feedback effects from patent protection to Schumpeterian 
creative destruction.  Patent protection may help trigger a wave of innovation that threatens 
established firms, but to the extent that it lessens the threat to established firms, it weakens their 
incentives to maintain a vigorous innovative pace.   
  These lessons appear to have trickled out at best slowly to the legal and policy-
formulating communities.  My own experience presenting them to audiences of patent attorneys 
reminded me of Jan Hus's fate defending his heretical views before representatives of the Vatican 
in Constance during 1415.
23  One might have expected the findings to have been especially 
relevant to legal scholars.  However, a search of Social Sciences Citation Index for 1987 through 
May 2006 revealed that only 11 percent of the 496 citations received by the principal Levin et al. 
paper -- the most acclaimed of the various patent survey reports, and with an appropriately high 
citation count -- were in legal journals.   
  The diffusion to economists also left something to be desired.  Beginning in the early 
1980s, there was an explosion of theoretical work on the economics of the patent system.
24  
However, nearly all of the theoretical contributions assumed -- contrary to the empirical evidence 
-- that patent protection was the only or principal barrier to rapid imitation of an invention or 
innovation.  Clearly, economists were delinquent in providing an adequate theoretical basis for 
policy reforms. 
                                            
22.  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper: 1942), especially Chapter VII. 
23.  Alvin Klevorick reported a more favorable reception presenting his group's findings to more selective 
audiences. 
24.  See my paper, "Patents: What Do We Know; What Must We Learn?" in the proceedings of a November 1996 
conference in Luxembourg on Appropriability and Patent Value: Econometric Aspects, which shows that the 
number of articles covered by the ECONLIT bibliography with "patent" or some compound thereof in their titles 
rose from an average of four per year between 1969 and 1982 to 23 per year between 1984 and 1995. 
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4. The Impeti to Policy Change 
 
During the 1970s, new initiatives for patent policy change began accelerating in the 
United States.  One might ascribe the changes to the cyclical character of patent policy change 
observed in the historical past, or to the increased susceptibility of the U.S. government to 
interest group lobbying.  On the latter we shall have more to say later.  There was, however, 
another impetus on the macroeconomic front. 
  In 1969, productivity -- output per hour of labor input -- in the nonfarm business sector of 
the U.S. economy dropped and then entered a period of significantly diminished annual growth.  
By 1980, productivity was 15 percent less than it would have been had it continued the 2.5 
percent annual growth rate it experienced from 1947 through 1969.  By 1985, the shortfall was 
20 percent.  Also, company-financed R&D expenditures by U.S. industry, adjusted for general 
inflation, experienced the first break from a rising trend since the collection of statistics was 
initiated beginning with the year 1950.  Further year-to-year declines occurred, and even in the 
good years growth was slower, so that by 1981, a 28 percent shortfall had accumulated.
25  
Research by David Ravenscraft and myself tapping data from a small but unusually detailed 
sample of company business units revealed that the decline in R&D spending was probably 
attributable to a drop in the profitability of R&D investments, and when R&D was cut back, its 
profitability rose again, precipitating new growth.
26
Two seminal papers published simultaneously in 1967 showed that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom among economists, the United States could attribute much of its 
comparative advantage in international trade to superior technological innovation.
27  A s  t h e  
industrial nations of Western Europe and especially Japan recovered fully from the devastation 
of World War II, however, they began aggressively to challenge U.S. corporations for 
                                            
25.  See F. M. Scherer, "R&D and Declining Productivity Growth," American Economic Review (May 1983), pp. 
215-218. 
26.  David Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer, "The Lag Structure of Returns to R&D," Applied Economics, December 
1982, pp. 603-620.  For similar results with the pharmaceutical industry, see F. M. Scherer, "The Link Between 
Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending," Health Affairs, September/October 2001, pp. 216-220. 
27.  William Gruber, Dileep Mehta, and Raymond Vernon, "The R&D Factor in International Trade and 
International Investment of United States Industries," and Donald B. Keesing, "The Impact of Research and 
Development on United States Trade," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 75 (February 1967), pp. 20-48. 
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technological leadership.
28  In 1975, U.S. exports of high-technology goods exceeded imports by 
a ratio of 2.4 to 1.  By 1980, the ratio had declined to 1.95 to 1 and by 1985 to 1.05 to 1.
29  The 
first reaction of U.S. industries to high-technology challenges from abroad was on average what 
the theory of arms races calls "submissive," i.e., a relative decline in R&D outlays.  Some 
industries such as steel, automobile tires, and television sets essentially gave up.  But others such 
as the producers of integrated circuits, medical imaging apparatus, optical fiber cables, earth-
moving equipment, and (less unambiguously) airliners responded aggressively and redoubled 
their R&D efforts to retain or regain their world market positions.   
  It was argued, among other fora in Congressional hearings, that patent policy reforms 
could help restore U.S. technological leadership.  Perhaps, but the chains of causation were 
clearly more complex.
30  Reductions in corporate R&D spending were precipitated by a fall in 
profitability.  If stronger patent protection could restore profitability, it might facilitate a 
resurgence.  And it was true that the most formidable new rival to U.S. technological leadership, 
Japan, maintained a much weaker patent system, among other things requiring the licensing of 
most patents and limiting through foreign exchange controls the royalties Japanese firms could 
pay U.S. patent holders.
31  But the exercise of patent rights within the United States did blunt 
some Japanese challenges, e.g., in optical fibers and integrated circuits.   
  Alternatively, however, the profits from innovation may have declined because the pool 
of attractive technological opportunities had been depleted following intensive "fishing" during 
the decades following World War II.  In this sense, the productivity growth slump that began 
around 1969 was an extension of the so-called Kondratief cycles emphasized by Joseph A. 
                                            
28.  For statistical analyses and eleven case studies, see F. M. Scherer, International High-Technology Competition 
(Harvard University Press: 1992). 
29.  U.S. National Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators: 1989 (Washington: 1989), p. 379.  Later 
editions of the same report show a more modest decline because of a redefinition of what constituted high-
technology industries. 
30.  For similar arguments, see Richard Posner, "The Insignificance of Macroeconomics in Patent Antitrust Law: A 
Comment on Millstein," Cardozo Law Review, vol. 9 (1988), pp. 1203-1207.  The paper on which Posner 
commented, by Ira Millstein, chief counsel at the time to the influential Business Roundtable, considered studies 
such as those by Levin et al. "inconclusive" and argued (fallaciously) that the effects of non-patent barriers "do not 
make the patent a less significant inducement." 
31.  See Daniel Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market (Stanford University Press: 1989), pp. 27-28; and Janusz 
Ordover, "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5 (Winter 
1991), pp. 43-60. 
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Schumpeter in a 1939 classic.
32  Industrial research and development efforts were intensified in 
those industries that elected to fight back against tougher foreign competition.
33  B u t  m o r e  
importantly, growth was restored, sometimes with long lags, as a result of fundamental scientific 
and technological breakthroughs that underlay the information and biotechnology revolutions of 
the 1990s and the early 21st century -- notably, the invention of integrated circuits around 1959 
and microprocessors in the early 1970s and the steady cost declines that occurred through 
learning-by-doing and denser circuit-packing; the laser in the late 1950s and optical fiber data 
transmission during the 1970s; and gene splicing during the early 1970s.  Patents played some 
role in all of these achievements, but given uncertainties, long lags, and the university origins of 
key breakthroughs, hardly a precipitating role.  The Department of Defense insisted upon 
widespread licensing of integrated circuit patents, and several early developers of 
microprocessors cross-licensed their patents among one another and to other chip makers.
34  A 
small fortune was made through broad-based licensing of basic laser patents by the winner of a 
law suit claiming priority of invention, but only after more than two decades of litigation.
35  
From a beginning in 1980, the Cohen-Boyer gene splicing patents were licensed at modest 
royalties to hundreds of entities by Stanford University and the University of California, yielding 
cumulative total royalties to the two universities of some $124 million by 1995. 
 
5. How Patent Policy Was Changed 
 
We turn now to our analysis of the principal changes in U.S. patent policy, focusing 
mainly on events of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
                                            
32.  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (McGraw-Hill: 1939).  For the most persuasive empirical support, see 
Alfred Kleinknecht, Innovation Patterns in Crisis: Schumpeter's Long Cycle Reconsidered (St. Martin's: 1987).  For 
an analysis from the 1970s and 1980s skeptical of the general depletion hypothesis, see Martin N. Baily and Alok 
Chakrabarti, Innovation and the Productivity Crisis (Brookings: 1988).  For theoretical support rooted in the logic of 
highly skew payoff distributions, see William D. Nordhaus, Comment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 
Microeconomics (1989), pp. 320-325. 
33.  International High-Technology Competition, Chapter 5. 
34. Texas Instruments later collected an estimated $1 billion in royalties on its integrated circuit patents until it lost 
key lawsuits in Japan and the United States.  "New Profits from Patents," Fortune, April 25, 1988, pp. 185-188; 
"When Copying Gets Costly," The Economist, May 9, 1992, p. 95; "Chip Patent Suit by Texas Instruments," New 
York Times, June 30, 1992; and "Texas Instuments' Shares Fall on Ruling," New York Times, September 1, 1994. 
35.  "Now the Father of the Laser Can Get Back to Inventing," Business Week, February 17, 1986, p. 98; and "An 
Unexpectedly Bright Idea," The Economist Technology Quarterly, June 11, 2005, pp. 25-29.  Had Bell Laboratories 
won the lawsuit, it would have been required under its antitrust decree to license the patents non-exclusively. 
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Copyright Law
 
  Changes in copyright law may have been precursors to what happened on the patent 
front, so a brief look is warranted.  As of 1962, the life of a copyright was limited to 28 years, 
with one 28-year renewal to 56 years allowed.  Then, in the four decades that followed, Congress 
extended copyright lives eleven times, so that by the turn of the century, works were copyrighted 
for 70 years beyond the life span of the copyrighted work's creator.
36  In 1976, copyright 
extensions were made automatic, without the need to apply or register.  According to Kevin 
Kelly, these changes occurred as an increasing number of creative works came to be owned not 
by individuals but by corporations able successfully to lobby Congress to prevent materials from 
returning to the public domain.  Or as Lawrence Lessig concludes (p. 304), "The law speaks to 
ideals, but it is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client.  And in a world 
where the rich clients have one strong view, the unwillingness of the profession to question or 
counter that one strong view queers the law." 
 
Patents from Government-Supported Research
 
  World War II and its aftermath, including the cultivation of basic science through the 
National Science Foundation and the development of atomic energy, brought the U.S. federal 
government into extensive technological cooperation with private industry and universities.   
Who should have primary rights to patents resulting from government-financed R&D was a 
question settled in a diversity of inconsistent ways.  Some clarity was brought through a policy 
statement issued by President John F. Kennedy in 1963,
37 but debate continued.  In 1965 an 
inter-agency task force, the Committee on Government Patent Policy, operating under the 
auspices of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, undertook an ambitious empirical 
study of how the various patent policies were working.  It hired a consulting firm, Harbridge 
House, to compile data on 2,024 patents made under government contracts and several hundred 
more originating in government laboratories, and to conduct a series of historical case studies on 
                                            
36.  See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law To Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity (Penguin: 2005), pp. 134-135; and Kevin Kelly, "Scan This Book," New York Times Magazine, 
May 14, 2006, p. 48. 
37.  The Kennedy memorandum was published in the Federal Register, vol. 28 (October 10, 1963). 
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attempts to bring inventions conceived with government financial support into private-sector 
utilization.  Harbridge House completed several interim volumes and, in May 1968, a four-
volume compendium of research findings.
38  The Committee on Government Patent Policy 
published its own report and patent policy recommendations on the fall of 1968
39 and presented 
them at a briefing conference before the Federal Bar Association in September 1969.  The 
Committee's recommendations, which emphasized flexibility in allowing contractors to obtain 
exclusive patent rights mainly when there were prospects of commercial utilization or when 
granting exclusive rights broadened the government's potential contractor base, formed the basis 
for a new policy statement issued by President Nixon on August 1971.
40
  The Harbridge House research revealed that several variables affected the likelihood that 
government contract-originated inventions would be commercially utilized:  (1)  the intrinsic 
relevance of the technology to civilian needs; (2)  whether the contractor had prior commercial 
experience in the relevant field; (3) how far the development had been carried under contract; (4) 
the magnitude of additional development outlays required in comparison to the market size and 
the risks attendant thereto; and (5) whether or not the contractor or another assignee had 
exclusive patent rights.  For 1720 patents on which complete data were available, commercial 
utilization rates varied over two key variables as follows:
41
 
      Contractor  Had Without  Prior 
      Prior  Commercial      Commercial 
            Experience         Experience 
 
  With exclusive rights                23.8%              6.6% 
 
  Without exclusive rights             13.3%              2.2% 
 
                                            
38.  Harbridge House, Inc., Government Patent Policy Study, published in loose-leaf binder form, May 1968.  The 
summary report is reproduced in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, 
Background Materials on Government Patent Policies, Vol. II (August 1976), pp. 69-140. 
39.  It is reproduced in Background Materials, vol. II, pp. 143-182.  I served as principal economic adviser to the 
Committee throughout the Harbridge House study period. 
40.  Federal Register, vol. 36 (August 1971).  It is reproduced in volume I of the House Committee on Science and 
Technology, Background Materials, pp. 11-23. 
41.  This analysis is drawn from Scherer, The Economics of Compulsory Patent Licensing, pp. 78-84. 
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Evidently, patent protection mattered, although the chain of causation remained 
ambiguous.  In some cases, the qualitative studies showed, exclusive rights encouraged 
investments in commercial utilization; in others, contractors bargained more vigorously to obtain 
exclusive rights when commercial utilization was expected.  
  The pharmaceutical industry was found again to be an extreme case.  One in-depth 
Harbridge House study revealed that, up to 1962, drug companies routinely screened new 
organic molecules synthesized by academic researchers under government grants.
42  However, 
when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare imposed new reporting requirements 
that threatened the exclusivity of drug companies' rights to commercialize molecules found to be 
therapeutically interesting, such testing ceased abruptly.  The moratorium ended in 1968 when 
HEW changed its policies to allow drug companies exclusive rights on grant-originated 
molecules they tested. 
  A particularly controversial question at the time was whether, when a government agency 
allowed its contractors to obtain exclusive patent rights, the government should retain "march-in" 
rights to require wider licensing of the patent if there was a failure to commercialize or there 
were monopolistic abuses in commercialization.  Cases of clear abuse were found to be rare, in 
all but one questionable instance because adequate substitute products existed.  Both the 
Committee on Government Patent Policy and the Nixon memorandum recommended retention 
of march-in rights, to be used flexibly and presumably rarely under an implicit rule of reason, or 
in cases of jeopardy to public health or safety.  
  The U.S. Congress chose in due course to insert its own views into the debate.  In 1965 S. 
1809, embodying compromise policies, was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but in 
1967 its consideration by the full Senate was postponed indefinitely pending completion of the 
Harbridge House Study.
43  A draft bill was proposed to Congress by the White House in August 
1976, supplanted by a bill drafted in the House of Representatives.
44  Hearings in 1976 before the 
                                            
42.  Harbridge House Inc., Report, "Effects of Government Patent Policy on Drug Research and New Product 
Development" (Boston: 1967), Sections I and IV. 
43.  Howard Forman, "Retrospection and Introspection Concerning Patents and Government Patent Protection," 
Journal of the Patent Office Society, vol. 49 (September 1967), pp. 687-688. 
44.  They are reproduced in Federal Council for Science and Technology, Report on Government Patent Policy 
(Washington: 1976), pp. 88-119. 
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House Committee on Science and Technology summoned as witnesses the executive secretary of 
the Committee on Government Patent Policy and others affiliated with it along with 
representatives of the principal government R&D contract-issuing agencies, industry, and an 
organization comprising university patent administrators.  The Harbridge House report summary 
and related documents were published as background materials.  No legislation ensued at first, 
but in subsequent sessions of Congress, further hearings were held by the House Science 
Committee as well as the Monopolies subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee.  The 
latter hearing, in December 1977, added substantive balance, inviting as witnesses inter alia 
outspoken Admiral Hyman Rickover (father of the Navy's nuclear submarine program), Walter 
Adams (an economist well-known for his anti-monopoly views), and the consumer activist 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. 
  After characteristic delays, two major bills emerged from the effort, the Bayh-Dole Act, 
signed into law in December 1980;
45 and the Stevenson-Wydler Act, passed in October 1980.
46  
The floor debates were brief, and both bills sailed through Congress (controlled in both houses 
by Democrats) on voice votes.  Bayh-Dole reversed the prevailing but flexible presumption that 
the government would retain title to inventions made under R&D contracts.  It articulated a 
presumption that government contracts or grants to academic researchers or small businesses 
would normally permit patent rights to be retained by the contractors, subject to march-in under 
imprecisely articulated conditions.  A 1987 executive order extended it to apply to all 
government R&D contract recipients, regardless of their size.
47  Stevenson-Wydler required the 
principal government agencies conducting R&D in-house to set up Research and Technology 
Applications offices.  Since "the whole point of [the] bill [was] to stimulate the 
commercialization of industrial innovations," as one Congressional proponent observed in the 
final debate,
48 the offices were encouraged to negotiate exclusive patent licenses with industry 
for inventions resulting from agency research.  In 1986, the Federal Technology Transfer Act 
extended Stevenson-Wydler to permit formation of cooperative research and development 
                                            
45.  PL 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019. 
46.  Public Law 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311. 
47.  3 C.F.R. 220 (1988).   
48.  Congressional Record, September 8, 1980, p. 24566. 
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agreements (CRADAs) between government laboratories and industry, with the industrial 
partners retaining principal patent rights but paying royalties to cooperating agencies and their 
inventor employees.
49
  These legislative patent policy changes had important implications.  Academic 
institutions in particular changed their behavior.  Many which had not done so already created 
technology licensing offices to encourage patenting of relevant inventions by faculty researchers.  
University patenting rose sharply -- from an average of 332 patents received per year during the 
last three years of the 1970s to 952 per year in the last three years of the 1980s.  At least part of 
the increase appears to have been caused by the imposition of lower standards on the patents 
sought.  There was a marked decline in the number of subsequent citations received by the 
average university patent following the law change.
50  Links between university researchers and 
their industry counterparts increased in number and intensity, with an undoubted positive impact 
on the commercialization of academic research, especially in the field of biotechnology.   
Whether academic research as a result has been diverted at least marginally from basic to more 
applied goals and whether discoveries are disclosed more slowly so as not to jeopardize 
patentability is less than certain.  To the extent that such consequences have followed, their 
desirability continues to be debated.
51  
  Especially in academic circles, but also on inventions made cooperatively with 
government laboratories, serious questions have arisen over the resulting product prices.  As we 
have seen, patents are of special importance to pharmaceutical (and related biopharma-ceutical) 
companies, in part because they provide strong protection from competitive imitation on 
products that often have relatively inelastic demands.  This means that high prices can be 
commanded.  AZT (azidothymidine), the first antiretroviral effective against AIDS, was 
synthesized by a medical institute researcher with federal research support.
52  After the 
                                            
49.  Public Law 99-502, 100 Statutes 1785 (October 1986).  No explicit provisions were included on march-in 
rights.  Sec. 2(b)(3) is ambiguous on whether the waiver of federal rights exhausts the possibility of march-in for 
non-governmental uses. 
50.  See Rebecca Henderson, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg, "Universities as Sources of Commercial 
Technology," in Jaffe and Trajtenberg, Patents, Citations & Innovations (MIT Press: 2002), pp. 252-256. 
51.  See e.g. Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace (Princeton University Press: 2003), pp. 10-12 and 140-143. 
52.  This discussion benefits from a case study, "AZT: A Favored Orphan?" written by Kris Thiessen at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government in 1998. 
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unpatented molecule was offered to the National Institutes of Health by the private firm 
Burroughs-Wellcome, its therapeutic efficacy was demonstrated in clinical trials conducted 
initially at NIH and Duke University with significant support from federal government funds.  
Burroughs-Wellcome was able to obtain "method of use" patents covering AZT along with 
exclusive marketing rights reflecting AZT's early "orphan drug" status.  It chose to sell AZT at 
annual costs per patient approximating $10,000 when production costs could not have been more 
than $2,000.  This pricing strategy provoked outrage among AIDS advocates and members of 
Congress plus demands that the National Institutes of Health exercise their march-in rights to 
require the issue of non-exclusive patent licenses.  That was not done, but Burroughs-Wellcome 
eventually implemented substantial price reductions in response to the public pressure.  Several 
other drugs conceived or developed with federal government support have had similar high-price 
histories.  What could have been the most egregious case was thwarted by a judicial finding of 
patent invalidity after the University of Rochester sought royalties it expected to reach $3 billion 
from its work, supported by a National Institutes of Health grant, underlying the development of 
Cox-2 inhibitors.
53
  The National Institutes of Health directorate has declined to exercise its Bayh-Dole 
march-in rights on patents covering drugs sold at particularly high prices.  Indeed, as of 2005, the 
march-in provision had never been invoked by a government agency.  There appear to be two 
main reasons.  For one, the leadership of NIH claimed to an investigator that it had no experience 
determining what a reasonable price was and did not consider implementing price controls to be 
part of its mission.
54  Also, the law itself left ambiguities.  The relevant march-in clause states in 
part that the granting agency has the right to compel issuance of non-exclusive licenses when:
55  
 
                                            
53.  "University's Patent for Celebrex Is Invalid," New York Times, February 14, 2004.  See University of Rochester 
v. G.D. Searle Co. et al., 358 F. 3d 916.  In November 2004 certiorari was declined by the Supreme Court.  See also 
"Jury Rules Company Infringed Drug Patent," Harvard Crimson, May 5, 2006, reporting on a Federal District Court 
finding in favor of royalties for a fundamental biological pathways discovery by Harvard University researchers 
licensed to a biotech company.  The case was Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly Co. et al., Federal District court, 
Massachusetts. 
54.  Private communication from the investigator to the author.  See also David Korn and Stephen Heinig, 
"Recoupment Efforts Threaten Federal Research," Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 2004, pp. 24-29. 
55.  35 U.S.C. Sec. 303 (a) (1) and (2). 
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(1)  ... [T]he contractor or assignee has not taken ... within a reasonable time ... effective 
steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention... [or] 
 
(2)  [A]ction is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably 
satisfied by the contractor, assignees, or their licenses. 
 
Debate centers on the meaning of the reasonable satisfaction of needs provision.  In 
response to a critical article in the Washington Post
56, the Bayh-Dole Act's co-sponsors insisted 
that the march-in rights are not contingent upon the pricing of a resulting product or the 
profitability of the commercializing company, but they can be invoked only "when the private 
industry collaborator has not successfully commercialized the invention as a product."
57  This 
seems an unreasonable interpretation of subparagraph (2) above even if not (1),
58 but on such 
fuzzy constructs, reasonable people can disagree. 
 
A Special Court for Patent Appeals
 
  The status quo as the 1970s began was for patent case decisions at the Federal district 
court level to be appealed to any of the ten regional appellate courts, while appeals from 
decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office went to a special Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, sitting in Washington, D.C.  There was considerable discontent over conditions in the 
appellate courts.  Quite generally, an increased number of appeals with little expansion in the 
number of judges led to a perceived overload situation.  Patent cases, which amounted to less 
than one percent of all decentralized appeals, were only a small part of the problem, although it 
was said (without clear quantitative evidence) that patent appeals were more complex than the 
average appeal.  Patent advocates were unhappy over what they claimed to be wide differences 
in the outcomes of their appeals, allegedly because some appellate courts took a tougher line 
toward the validity of challenged patents, and on whether patents passing the validity screen 
were actually infringed, than others.  This was said to have led to "forum shopping" -- patent 
                                            
56.  Peter Arno and Michael Davis, "Paying Twice for the Same Drugs," Washington Post, March 27, 2002, p. A-21. 
57.  Birch Bayh and Bob Dole, "Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner," Washington Post, April 11, 2002, 
p. A28. 
58.  For an extended discussion, see Peter S. Arno and Michael H. Davis, "Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug 
Price Controls?" Tulane Law Review, vol. 75 (February 2001), pp. 631-693. 
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owners sought venue in appellate courts friendly toward patent protection while alleged 
infringers sought more skeptical courts.  Differences between courts in legal precedents were 
also an alleged problem, and inter-court differences were seldom carried to the Supreme Court 
for resolution.  Patent advocates sought a unified appellate forum that would minimize forum-
shopping and generate consistent precedents. 
  Appellate court reform questions were addressed repeatedly by diverse study groups.   
One of the most thorough was the so-called Hruska Commission, chaired by Senator Roman 
Hruska, which delivered its conclusions in 1975.
59  It favored creation of a new nationwide 
appellate court to which matters that posed important precedential questions (inclduing patent 
cases) would be transferred at the behest of the normal appellate courts, which would retain 
jurisdiction over most patent appeals from federal district courts.  Or alternatively, cases could be 
referred to the court by the Supreme Court when the high court was reluctant to hear an appeal 
itself.  However, the proposal to create a separate court hearing all appeals on patents or other 
specialized subject matter was soundly rejected (a point largely neglected in subsequent 
Congressional reports and debate).  The Commission warned that:
60
 
... [T]he quality of decision-making would suffer as the specialized judges become 
subject to "tunnel vision," seeing the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights 
stemming from broad exposure to legal problems in a variety of fields.... Judges of a 
specialized court, given their continued exposure to and greater expertise in a single field 
of law, might impose their own views of policy even where the scope of review under the 
applicable law is supposed to be more limited.... [I]ndeed the court as a whole may be 
"captured" by special interest groups. 
 
A consultant to the Commission found that among 90 identified conflicts on legal 
doctrines at the U.S. appellate court level, only three were in the patent field.
61
  Nevertheless, prodded in part by President Carter, the U.S. Congress began considering 
bills (H.R. 3806, 2405, and eventually H.R. 4482 and S. 1700) that would create a unified new 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over all patent appeals as well as 
federal contract dispute claims, customs matters, and an array of other subject matter that was 
                                            
59.  Its report is reproduced as "Proposed Revision of Appellate System," 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). 
60.  67 F.R.D. 195, 234-235 (1975).  See also Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 
(Princeton University Press: 1955), pp. 116-117. 
61.  67 F.R.D. 195, 196 (1975). 
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pruned back in Congressional committees.  The bill was passed in both houses of Congress but 
became bogged down through unrelated procedural complexities in late 1980.  It was called up 
again in the 97th Congressional session beginning in January 1981  -- a Congress in which 
Republicans had gained a majority in the Senate while Democrats retained control of the House.  
New hearings were held.  Two witnesses at the principal House Judiciary Committee hearing 
were judges from existing courts who would be automatically promoted to the new court and 
another was a company patent attorney who would later be appointed to the new court.  In 
addition to a former Commissioner of Patents, other witnesses represented the American Patent 
Law Association, the American Bar Association, the Industrial Research Institute (presumably 
reflecting the views of R&D-oriented corporations), and an independent committee opposing the 
new law, one member of which had testified in an earlier hearing on behalf of the American Bar 
Association. 
  The Bar Association was split.  Some of its patent law members, and especially those 
who practiced in Washington, D.C., favored the bill.  Others were against it.  The ABA had 
created committees to consider the proposal for a centralized patent appeals court.  At its plenary 
meeting in February 1980, a majority of the members present voted against it.
62  The ABA 
representative at hearings in April 1981 reported "very, very substantial division in views among 
patent lawyers;" said that the forum shopping claim was overblown; and testified that:
63
 
Uniformity, without more ... is quite plainly not a desirable objective.  The legal system 
as a whole reaps the reward that various ideas are able, in the words of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, to "compete for acceptance in the marketplace" such that the law is refined and 
grows in a rational and just manner. 
 
A House committee report following the hearings recommended creation of the new 
court by merging the existing federal Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of 
Claims, with jurisdiction mainly for the subject matter of those lower courts but handling patent 
appeals from all federal circuits.  It observed that the responsible Subcommittee had inquired 
"deeply into technological innovation as an element of productivity in the American 
                                            
62.  See the testimony of Benjamin L. Zelenko at the June 1980 hearings, reproduced as an appendix in U.S. House 
of Repre-sentatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of 
Justice on H.R. 2405 (April 1981), p. 422. 
63.  Testimony of James W. Geriak in the Hearings on H.R. 2405, April 1981, supra note 58, p. 85. 
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marketplace" and cited witness testimony arguing that the new court would be "one of the most 
far-reaching reforms that could be made to strengthen the United States patent system in such a 
way as to foster technological growth and industrial innovation."
64  There was no focused 
testimony on the causes of the productivity slump or on how changes in patent policy might be 
expected to remedy it. 
  During the most extended debate on the bill, a list was presented of individuals and 
organizations that had, usually through letters, supported passage of the bill.
65  Among 85 
corporations favoring the bill, including two universities, 76 of the letters were signed by patent 
attorneys and only five by individuals whose titles suggested broader responsibilities.  Among 
the 20 organizations cited for their support (none with responsible individuals identified), six 
were patent law groups, two federal bar associations, six business interest groups, and two were 
American Indian tribes.  If one understands how Washington works, one must infer that lobbyists 
in favor of the new court were active.  
  One amendment made to the bill during its journey through Congress was a statement of 
the sense of Congress that the quality of the Federal judiciary is determined by the competence 
of its judges, and that President should nominate as judges for the new court "from a broad range 
of qualified individuals" -- a counterfoil to the charge that the court's judges would be narrow 
specialists.
66   
  In the definitive House of Representatives roll call vote on the bill November 18, 1981, 
321 voted in favor and 76 against.  Among Democratic congressmen, the vote in favor was 9.5 to 
1; among Republicans (in the minority), 2.2 to 1.  A regression analysis of the vote division 








                                            
64.  House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Report together with Dissenting Views, Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1981 accompanying H.R. 4482 (November 4, 1981), pp. 20 and 27. 
65.  Congressional Record, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. 27793-4. 
66.  Section 305 (1) and (2).   
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 DEM   Dummy  variable;  1  if Democrat, 0 if Republican. 
  
  RAND   Research and development expenditures in 1981, (millions of dollars per  
      million population) in a representative's home state.
67
 
PROPAT  The percent of cases in which patents were found to be both valid and 




  The resulting regression equation in ordinary least squares
69  was as follows, with VOTE 
scaled as 1 for a "yes" vote and 0 for a "nay" vote, and with t-ratios in subscripted brackets: 
 
VOTE  =   0.706 + 0.222 DEM + 0.00033 RAND  - 0.0035 PROPAT; 
               [10.75]      [5.83]               [2.31]                        [2.04] 
 
     R
2 = 0.112; N = 394. 
 
The preponderance of Democratic support is verified, holding constant other variables.  
Representatives from states with relatively intensive R&D activity were more likely to support 
the bill, all else equal.  Surprisingly, representatives from circuits with a high prior incidence of 
decisions in favor of patent holders were more likely to vote against the court's creation, all else 
equal. 
  The vote in the Republican-controlled Senate on December 8, 1981, was more one-sided, 
with 83 votes in favor and only six nays, three from each party.  And so the new Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was created, commencing its work on October 1, 1982.   
  Its initial complement of judges was inherited from the prior Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and Court of Claims.  As of early 1983, four of the eleven sitting judges had 
backgrounds in patent law; seven others were from alternative backgrounds.  The enabling 
statute urged the President to make new nominations "from a broad range of qualified 
individuals."  A committee appointed by President Reagan to explore the sources of declining 
                                            
67.  The source is National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry: 1987 (NSF 89-323), pp. 55-
56. 
68.  The data are from Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (Harvard Business School Press: 
2005), p. 100. 
69.  Logit regressions were quite similar; the coefficients in OLS regressions are more easily interpreted as the 
amount by which the vote fraction shifts with a unit change in an explanatory variable. 
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productivity growth and identify improvements recommended to the contrary that the President 
appoint "experienced patent lawyers to vacancies that occur in the new Court of Appeals."
70  The 
recommendation does not appear to have had much impact.  In May 2006, the court, whose 
membership had turned over completely, had five active judges with patent practice backgrounds 
and six without.  However, the court heard a spectrum of cases broader than merely patent 
matters. Although assignment to panels was in principle random, the choice of the judge who 
would report the panel's decision, and hence with the opportunity to set at least a precedential 
tone, was far from random.  A study by John Allison and Mark Lemley revealed that in 143 
patent validity decisions rendered by the Court between 1989 and 1996, 63 percent of the 
decisions were written by judges with prior patent practice experience, even though the judges 
with a patent background comprised only 38 percent of the total number of judges participating 
in panels hearing validity arguments.
71  Similarly, in a panel discussion among CAFC judges 
televised by C-SPAN3 on May 19, 2006, chief judge Paul Michel observed that the court did not 
want judges without patent law experience hearing patent cases and noted the importance of 
"cohesion" among the CAFC members. 
  Senator Robert Dole was quoted in the floor debate as saying in Judiciary Committee 
deliberations preceding the passage of S- 1700 that "the bill will not substantively affect current 
law."
72  However, affect it did.  The changes were immediate and dramatic, but also subtle.  
Most significantly, the new CAFC proved to be much more generous than the decentralized 
appellate courts in ruling that patents whose validity was challenged on the basis of insufficient 
novelty or utility were in fact valid.  The old courts rejected roughly two thirds of the patents on 
validity grounds; the new court accepted roughly two thirds.
73  This fed back to induce a higher 
acceptance rate at the district courts.  With a validity ruling more likely, there were more 
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attempts by patent holders to enforce patents, whose ultimate success depended then upon 
whether the courts ruled the relevant patents to have been infringed.  The new appellate court's 
statistical record in infringement questions was more like that of the previous decentralized 
courts, and on one point -- interpretation of the so-called doctrine of equivalents -- the CAFC 
tended to view the scope of litigated patents somewhat more narrowly than its predecessors.
74  
But with a higher fraction of patents found to be valid, the percentage of tested patents found to 
be both valid and infringed rose significantly.   
  The new court also blazed a trail toward accepting new kinds of patents, e.g., on business 
methods and computer software, on which the difficulties of showing that prior art would 
preclude patenting were particularly great, and (with Supreme Court encouragement
75) an 
expanded array of life form inventions -- much wider than European Community chose to 
protect.
76  It  proved more amenable to accepting jury findings, despite evidence that juries were 
more likely to be awed by claims of technical novelty than judges.  It was more willing than the 
decentralized courts to grant preliminary and final injunctions eliminating infringers from a field 
-- although on this, its exertions may be restrained by an important Supreme Court 
pronouncement in 2006 declaring that there exists no "general rule" supporting injunctions in 
patent infringement.
77   And versignificantly, it revised the principles for assessing damages in 
cases of proven infringement, making it more likely that estimates of profits lost by the patent 
holder would err on the generous side, that the "profits lost" standard would normally be favored 
rather than the milder "reasonable royalty" standard, and awarding damages under both standards 
even though the later is logically subsumed within the former.
78  Under the new standards several 
damages awards running into the hundreds of millions of dollars were made. 
                                            
74.  See Henry and Turner, "The Court of Appeals," supra note --.  A key case was Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F. 3rd 558 (2000). 
75.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (June 1980). 
76. For a survey 1,770 DNA sequence patents issued between September 1998 and June 2000, see F. M. Scherer, 
"The Economics of Human Gene Patents," Academic Medicine, vol. 77 (December 2002), pp. 1356-1359.  See also 
Kyle Johnson and Fiona Murray, "Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome," Science, vol. 310 
(October 14, 2005), pp. 239-240. 
77.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (May 15, 2006). 
78.  See Cecil D.Quillen, Jr., "Innovation and the Current U.S. Patent System," forthcoming in the Virginia Law and 
Business Review (2006). 
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  These changes on balance strengthened patent protection, made it likely that companies 
found to be infringing valid patents would pay substantial damages, and hence raised the 
perceived benefits to companies (and universities) from building strong patent portfolios.  Patent 
applications and patent issues soared in the years following the creation of the CAFC (marked by 
a dotted vertical line), as shown in Figure 1.  A regression analysis shows a distinct and 
statistically significant break in the series at the year 1983,
79 with the growth rate of applications 
(less subject than patent issues to Patent Office backlog fluctuations) averaging 1.4 percent per 
year between 1955 (after postwar adjustments were made) and 1982, and 5.97 percent per year 
between 1983 and 2004.  With many more patents being sought, more patent attorneys had to be 
hired.  The number of patent attorneys per billion dollars of price level-adjusted industrial R&D 
expenditures rose from approximately 50 in the 1970s to 75 in the mid-1990s.
80  With many 
more patents being issued, specific areas of technology became more congested, leading to a 
higher likelihood that one firm's proprietary technology would conflict with another firm's.
81  In 
an analogue of an arms race, companies strove all the more vigorously to expand their patent 
portfolios so they could use their patents in defensive counter-claims when accused of 
infringement.  With many more patents and higher damages if one's technology were found to 
infringe another firm's patents, fielding new products became like walking through a mine field, 
with dire consequences from a misstep.   
  While stronger patent protection per se should have increased the profitability of 
innovation and hence stimulated R&D expenditures, all else equal, the increased danger from 
infringing another firm's patents exerted an opposite negative influence.  Figure 2 shows the 
long-run trend of U.S. industrial expenditures on research and development from 1953, the first 
year covered by systematic surveys, through 2000.  Outlays are measured in constant 1996 
dollars.  As in Figure 1, the plot is logarithmic, so that a straight line indicates a constant rate of 
                                            
79.  The F-ratio in a test of differences is 8.54 percent, which is highly significant statistically, with N = 20 and 81.  
The data, including only "utility" patents and not design or plant patents, were obtained from the Patent and 
Trademark Office web site. 
80.  John Barton, "Reforming the Patent System," Science, vol. 287 (March 17, 2000), p. 1933. 
81.  See e.g. Jaffe and Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, supra note 68, especially Chapter 2; Bronwyn Hall 
and Rosemarie Ziedonis, "The Patent Paradox Revisted: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor 
Industry," Rand Journal of Economics (Spring 2001, pp. 101-128); and Ziedonis, "When the Giants' Shoulders Are 
Crowded: Fragmented Rights and Incentives To Patent," working paper, March 2001. 
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growth.  Factors other than the legal regime in which patents were administered -- notably, 
macroeconomic shocks, the energy shocks of 1973-74, and the advent of wholly new 
technologies such as the Worldwide Web -- had an obvious impact.  The most that can be said is 
that there is no noticeable acceleration of the growth rate in R&D following the creation of 
CAFC.  In a statistical test comparing the periods 1956-82 and 1983-2000, the rates of growth 
are insignificantly different.
82
  I conclude that the CAFC did change patent policy when the legislators who supported it 
said it would not, that the record of debates on the enabling bill contains no solid evidence that 
the change would in fact stimulate R&D, and that there is no evidence of an acceleration in 





  As the 1980s dawned, pharmaceutical manufacturers had two major complaints, leading 
eventually to the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.
83
  For the makers of relatively new, typically patented, drugs, the key problem was 
declining effective patent life.  Responding to the record of adverse side effects found with the 
tranquilizer Thalidomide, the Kefauver-Harris Act of 1962 increased the Food and Drug 
Administration's power to ensure that new drugs were safe.  It also required proof from well-
controlled clinical trials of a new drug's efficacy as well as its safety.  Clinical trial periods and 
FDA decision-making lengthened appreciably as a result -- to an average of 7.5 years, with 
considerable variation, between the time when the FDA authorized testing in human beings to 
the date at which approval for marketing a new drug (a so-called NDA) was granted.  Typically, 
drug companies filed for patent protection when animal tests demonstrated possible therapeutic 
effects, about a year before human tests began.  With an average lag between patent application 
and patent issuance just short of two years and a patent life (since changed) of 17 years from 
                                            
82.  The F-ratio is only 1.33.  Observations before 1956 are excluded because the National Science Foundation had 
not perfected its survey techniques.  The source is National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators: 
2004, vol. 2, pp. A4-5-6. 
83.  PL 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
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issue to expiration, new drug marketers enjoyed on average only 10 to 11 years from the 
initiation of marketing to patent expiration, at which point, in principle, generic competition 
could begin.  Both directly and through their trade association, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers' Association (PMA), the research-oriented drug companies sought relief from 
Congress in the form of patent life extension. 
  The generic drug manufacturers also had a problem.  Because of restrictive FDA rules 
approved by the Supreme Court,
84 the obstacles to generic competition were substantial even 
after relevant patents expired.  Generic producers were not able simply to "free ride" on the test 
results of the original drug producers, which, the pioneers claimed, generated data that were their 
exclusive property.  Would-be generic producers were required to conduct their own clinical 
trials nearly as extensive as those of the pioneers.  This barrier to imitation significantly 
discouraged generic entry.
85  Generic drug companies sought from Congress eased testing 
requirements taking advantage of an original drug's evident safety and efficacy, proved in both 
FDA-required tests and the marketplace. 
  Extensive hearings were conducted by several Congressional committees.
86   T h e  
hearings were a model of how proposed legislation should be considered.  They included not 
only top officials of the principal interested parties -- the PMA, the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Industry Association, the Food and Drug Administration, and various drug companies -- but also 
the government's Office of Technology Assessment, which had made a study of the various 
proposals; a leading economic researcher on the economics of pharmaceutical innovation; a 
university-based physician who had done important research on drug testing; consumer advocate 
Ralph Nader; and a representative of the AARP, among others.  The relevant issues were 
thoroughly aired. 
                                            
84.  U.S. v. Generix Drug Corp. et al., 460 U.S. 453 (March 1983). 
85.  See E. W. Kitch, "The Patent System and the New Drug Application," in R. L. Landau, ed., Regulating New 
Drugs (University of Chicago: 1973), pp. 81-108. 
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  In the end, compromise language was negotiated by the two principal outside parties -- 
the PMA and the Generic Industry Association.  It had two main parts.  First, an extension on the 
life of one patent, chosen by the drug firm, would be allowed to compensate for regulation-
mandated test and decision delays.  The maximum extension, however, could not be more than 
five years or enough only to allow an effective patent life of 14 years from the time of FDA 
approval.  Second, once patents expired, generic producers would be allowed to enter the market 
immediately on the basis of chemical analysis and abbreviated clinical tests -- typically involving 
24 subjects -- showing that the generic version was chemically identical (i.e., bioequivalent) to, 
and was absorbed into a patient's bloodstream at approximately the same rate as, the original 
patented and FDA-approved drug.  The most controversial part of the compromise, Section 202, 
the so-called Bolar amendment,
87 allowed generic drug makers to produce experimental 
quantities of a patented product "solely for uses reasonably related to ... the submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates ... drugs" -- i.e., to conduct the trials 
demonstrating bioequivalence.  In this way, the generic drug maker could submit its application 
to the FDA and, with luck, hit the ground running with its marketable product the day the 
original drug's blocking patent expired.  The Bolar amendment established a new principle -- that 
experimental uses of a product might not be blocked by patent protection.
88
  The compromise was passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress.  
Within the pharmaceutical industry, however, controversy persisted.  A cabal led by the Swiss-
based company Hoffmann-LaRoche was displeased and saw to it that the president of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Lewis Engman, who had played a key role in 
brokering the compromise that eventually reached Congress, was fired from his position. 
  The Hatch-Waxman Act had important effects.  The share of all drug prescriptions 
dispensed in the United States and filled generically rose steadily from 19 percent in 1984, when 
the new law was passed, to 47 percent in 2000, with further increases expected. 
89 Generic 
                                            
87.  The name comes from a decision by the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Roche Products Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F. 2d 858 (April 1984), preventing generic manufacturers from producing test 
quantities of a drug as long as the drug was under patent. 
88.  For an extension reversing the CAFC's narrow reading of the Bolar amendment and allowing use in 
investigating novel drugs at preclinical stages as well as generics, see Merck KGAA v. Integra LifeSciences, 125 
S.Ct. 2372 (June 14, 2005). 
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competition clearly became tougher.
90  Significant patent life extensions were also achieved, 
partly under the main terms of the Act and partly through strategic manipulation of provisions 
defining the various parties' rights in patent disputes.
91  The extension in patent lives should have 
increased industry profits, but more rapid and extensive generic competition worked in the 
opposite direction.  Industry profitably did increase markedly after passage of the Act,
92 but the 
rising trend began three years earlier and had two other plausible causes -- the advent of so-
called "rational drug design" in which scientific knowledge played a larger role, and the rapid 
spread of health insurance plans with drug expenditure reimbursement, which reduced the 
elasticity of demand and hence supported increased prices for patented drugs sold under 
monopolistic conditions.   
  A plausible argument can be advanced that the Act shaped an ideal compromise in terms 
of stimulating pharmaceutical innovation.  Longer patent protection had at the margin its desired 
effect in increasing the profitability of a given efficacious new drug.  Less widely recognized, 
but equally true, the acceleration of generic competition forced pharmaceutical makers to 
intensify their efforts to discover and test improved replacement products, for without them, the 
sales and profits from a patented drug can be expected to plummet shortly after patent 
expiration.
93  Thus, the Act provided both a carrot and a stick to encourage innovation. 
 
Changes in Administration of the Patent-Antitrust Interface
 
  There were other Congressional and judicial decisions altering patent policy in the 1980s 
and 1990.  Here we note briefly one other line of development -- the presumptions applied by the 
                                            
90.  One consequence is little recognized.  By reducing the front-end testing costs incurred for generic entry, the 
Act's provisions not only encourage early generic competition, but make it possible for more generic firms to 
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the U.S. market explains why U.S. generic drug prices tend to be the lowest in the world. 
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to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002); and "Generic Drugs: The Window Has Loopholes," New York 
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92.  See Scherer, "The Link Between Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending," supra note 26. 
93.  See the C-SPAN3 interview with Sidney Taurel, CEO of Eli Lilly Co., on May 8, 2006. 
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U.S. antitrust agencies when the exploitation of patent positions was alleged to conflict with 
antitrust prohibitions. 
  During the 1970s the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice articulated a list of 
nine so-called "no-no's," most of which delineated what a patent holder could do in licensing 
other firms before running afoul of the antitrust laws.
94  The approach in effect asked whether 
restrictions written into patent licenses were necessary and whether less restrictive measures 
could have achieved the same objectives.  Agreements to set minimum prices at which licensees 
could sell licensed products and to restrict licensing of third parties, mandatory package 
licensing, and requirements that the licensee buy unpatented products from the licensor (i.e., ties) 
were viewed with special skepticism. 
  Partly because of Supreme Court decisions taking a more benign view of certain vertical 
restraints (such as exclusive franchising) and the installation of relatively pro-business Reagan 
appointees, a more tolerant view emerged on how patents and antitrust interacted.  An early 
statement by an Antitrust Division official said that the nine no-no's "contain more error than 
accuracy" as statements of rational economic policy.
95  Five years later a deputy assistant 
attorney general criticized the "history of antagonism toward patent licensing" and urged that 
patent licensing could have numerous pro-competitive benefits.
96  On this he was clearly correct.  
Some deeper premises, however, were debatable.  Ignoring the emerging literature on alternative 
first-mover advantages, he singled out patents as instruments for preventing free-riding on 
investments in technology, arguing that "patents create property rights without which technology 
would not exist -- or certainly not in its current abundance."  As the work of Taylor and 
Silberston and Mansfield, already available at the time, made clear, this could be true for some 
new technologies, but by no means for all.  The DoJ spokesman's further premise, therefore, is 
also questionable:  
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Efforts to appropriate as much as possible of the surplus -- the social value in excess of 
marginal cost -- lying under the demand curve for the patented technology do not harm 
competition.  Indeed, the potential for appropriating those rents is the engine [emphasis 
added] that drives the technology market. 
 
In effect, the implication was that almost anything done unilaterally to increase an 
innovator's profits was beneficial for competition  --  and given the way antitrust had come to be 
interpreted, beneficial for consumers.  Such a view goes too far.   
  In 1995, after substantial interaction with the legal and scholarly communities, the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission jointly issued new Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property.  In effect, the Guidelines stated that the antitrust agencies 
would analyze questionable patent - antitrust interactions on a "rule of reason" basis, asking 
whether a restraint "is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits [e.g., superior or 
more extensive innovation] that outweigh ... anticompetitive effects."  Given the complex 
repercussions of the practices addressed, a careful "rule of reason" approach seems eminently 
reasonable.  One might hope, however, that antitrust agency staff charged with enforcing the 
guidelines and the courts interpreting them possess a broad understanding of what economic 
analysis -- on both the theoretical and empirical sides -- reveals about the limited and conflicting 
roles patents play. 
 
Extension of U.S. Patent Standards to Other Nations
 
  Undoubtedly more important than reforms in domestic patent law were U.S. efforts to 
influence the patent laws of other nations, and especially less-developed nations.  Piracy of 
copyrighted music, motion pictures, and computer programs -- matters not addressed in this 
paper -- was one provocation.
97  On patents, a key problem was the fact that the Paris 
Convention governing inter-national patent relations, inaugurated in 1883, allowed member 
nations to determine the coverage of their patent laws, requiring mainly that they not 
discriminate between domestic and foreign patent applicants.  Many nations had patent systems 
providing much less protection for inventions than the United States did.  Among 33 sizeable 
                                            
97.  The term "piracy" was already used to denote cribbing of musical compositions in the 18th Century.  See F. M. 
Scherer, Quarter Notes and Bank Notes: The Economics of Music Composition in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
(Princeton University Press: 2005), pp. 167 and 176. 
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developing and high-income nations in 1990, for example, 14 offered no patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products, 15 none for food products, and 11 none for chemical products.
98  Eight 
of the 33, including Switzerland, home to three of the world's leading pharmaceutical companies, 
had joined the list of nations allowing patents for pharmaceutical products only between 1975 
and 1989. 
  For pharmaceuticals, in which patents are accorded such importance, Italy was an early 
bete noire and focus of action.  A patent law passed in 1939 and still applicable in the 1970s 
excluded pharmaceutical products from patentability.  As a consequence, Italy became a world 
leader in producing and exporting generic pharmaceuticals to other nations -- before existing 
patents expired for the importing nations without product patent protection, otherwise as soon as 
national patent laws allowed.  Among other things, during the late 1960s it was a major supplier 
of early "wonder drugs," broad-spectrum antibiotics, to the U.S. military purchasing authorities.  
This was stopped through an amendment to a foreign assistance bill, offered by a Congressman 
from Indianapolis on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1961 and passed by a vote of 
87 to 65 (less than a quorum) after cursory debate.
99  A 1963 attempt to change the Italian law, 
led by large Italian pharmaceutical companies, was blocked in the Italian Parliament owing to 
small-firm opposition.
100  During the 1970s, a group of multinational pharmaceutical companies 
from the U.S.A., Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, joined by some larger Italian firms, 
challenged the constitutionality of Italy's law.  In March 1978, Italy's Corte Constitutionale found 
the exclusion of pharmaceutical products to be unconstitutional and ordered the prompt 
acceptance of drug patent applications.  In the decade that followed, Italy's balance of trade in 
pharmaceuticals shifted from positive to negative.
101  India took Italy's place as the world's 
leading supplier of generic drugs to nations without product patents and, given its first-mover 
advantage, as an early generic supplier in the United States. 
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  Beginning in the late 1970s a concerted effort began to bring the full array of laggard 
nations up to U.S. patent law standards.  Among the prime movers were the U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies.  Unlike the other legislative developments covered by this paper, the lobbying efforts 
that followed are richly documented.
102  Between 1981 and 1987, Edmund Pratt, CEO of Pfizer 
Inc., was chairman of the U.S. President's Advisory Committee on Trade and Negotiations 
(ACPTN).  Its subcommittee on intellectual property was chaired by IBM CEO John Opel.  In 
their role as advisors to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), coordinating international trade 
matters for the Executive Branch, and also in their communications with Congress, they pushed 
hard to bring patent and copyright issues to the forefront of U.S. trade dealings with other nations 
and international agencies.  At the time USTR had, with one overburdened exception, virtually 
no independent economic analysis capability.  Pratt and Opel reached out to organize lobbying 
efforts by other industry groups such as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the 
Business Roundtable, and a panoply of organizations seeking copyright protection. 
  These lobbying efforts led initially to the passage of two amendments to Section 301 of 
the U.S. International Trade Act, which defines unfair trade practices against which the United 
States might retaliate.  The first, in 1984, authorized the U.S. government to impose unilateral 
sanctions against nations that failed to provide adequate intellectual property protection.  Section 
301 was strengthened into what was called "Special 301" in 1988, requiring the USTR to prepare 
an annual report identifying foreign nations with the most objectionable patent and copyright 
policies, placing them on a priority list, and commencing an investigation to determine whether 
the subject nations' "IP" policies merited retaliatory measures.  The USTR proceeded cautiously, 
establishing in 1989 only a "priority watch list" that included Brazil, India, Mexico, the Peoples 
Republic of China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.  In May 1989 the United States 
levied 100 percent tariffs on $39 million of imports from Brazil as punishment for its deficient 
pharmaceutical patent policies.  Threats were levied against Mexico, South Korea, China, and 
Thailand, among others.  In 1991 the first actual priority list was issued, naming Thailand, India, 
and China as prime targets.  Thailand's government had been dissolved in a no-confidence vote 
                                            
102.  See especially Michael Santoro, "Pfizer: Global Protection of Intellectual Property," Harvard Business School 
case study 9-392-073 (1992); and Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of 
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as a direct consequence of a patent bill introduced into the National Assembly in 1988 in 
response to early U.S. pressure. 
  The business advisors to the U.S. government and their industry allies also worked on a 
broader international front.  Both directly and through U.S. representatives, they sought to have 
the Paris Convention modified to require uniformly high patent law standards for member 
nations.  Efforts to reach this goal through the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 
a branch of the United Nations, and at the Nairobi round of Paris Convention negotiations were a 
failure.  Efforts with WIPO were "a disaster," a Pfizer executive said, because "WIPO works by 
majority, and simply put, there were more of them than us."
103  Nairobi Round efforts during the 
late 1970s failed because United States, European, and Japanese delegates were unable to agree 
on a united front.
104  Absorbing the lessons from these failures, Pratt and Opel organized a 
combined lobbying effort by U.S. patent- and copyright-sensitive industries, who in turn 
recruited their counterparts in Europe, e.g., the Dolder Group of pharmaceutical companies,
105 
and the Keidanren in Japan.  All put pressure on their governments to make stronger intellectual 
property rights a priority issue in international trade deliberations.  
  The opportunity arose with the start of a new round of international trade policy 
negotiations -- the Uruguay Round -- in September 1986.  The United States component of the 
effort was organized through an "Intellectual Property Committee" comprising the chief 
executives of 13 major companies.
106  Working with their counterparts from Europe and Japan, 
the IPC members distributed in June 1988 a 100-page "Basic Framework" setting goals for the 
inclusion of intellectual property issues in whatever treaty resulted from Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  A key to the agreed-upon strategy was "linkage."  Most less-developed nations 
opposed their inclusion, but United States negotiators, supported inter alia by individuals 
seconded to their team from the Patent and Trademark Office, made it clear that the United 
States would not ratify any treaty unless it included IP standards, and there would be no cherry-
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picking -- all provisions had to be accepted by a ratifying nation.  If less-developed nations were 
eventually to secure relief from the Multi-Fibre Agreement, which limited the textile exports on 
which they had comparative advantage, and developed-nation barriers to agricultural product 
imports, they would have to go along with the intellectual property provisions.  And perhaps 
even more important, having intellectual property questions covered by the ratified Uruguay 
Round Treaty removed most possibilities that the United States could brandish its Section 301 
sword unilaterally.  Tough bargaining yielded a compromise draft of what came to be called the 
"TRIPS" (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement, which was included 
in the final draft treaty compiled by the GAAT Secretary-General and in the ultimate treaty that 
replaced GAAT with the World Trade Organization. 
  U.S. advocates of TRIPS argued inter alia that less-developed nations should welcome 
strengthened patent laws because they would encourage domestic innovation, which among other 
things flourished in the early history of the United States, and because it would induce more 
inward technology transfer through foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises.  There 
is an element of paradox in this argument, since most less-developed nations with weak patent 
policies were opposed to the changes, which suggests that the LDCs did not know what was 
good for them.  The argument also overlooks the fact that during the first 47 years of its 
existence, the United States provided strong patent protection to domestic residents, but denied 
patents to foreigners, whereas LDCs were being asked under TRIPS to increase the scope of their 
patent protection to both domestics and foreigners.  Economic theory provided at best ambiguous 
guidance on the alleged benefits to poor nations of strong and open patent systems.
107  Some 
econometric studies suggested that strong patent systems encouraged inward foreign direct 
investment, but the most positive early findings were based on subjective measures of patent 
system strength that could have reflected the evaluators' broader views on the desirability of 
nations for investing, and the only early study using more objective measures reported negative 
or inconclusive results.
108
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  The opposition of LDC negotiators to uniform U.S.-grade patent protection led to 
compromises in the TRIPS version ultimately accepted.  For one, full implementation of TRIPS 
by nations categorized as least-developed could be delayed until 2005.  Provision was made in 
Article 40 for non-exclusive compulsory licensing of patents in cases of monopolistic abuse and 
also, in Article 31: 
 
[Such] use may ... be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to 
obtain authorization from the rights holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time.  This requirement may be waived by a Member in case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use. 
 
Curiously, most references to this provision in the U.S. press have stressed the "national 
emergency" part and ignored the language allowing compulsory licenses when negotiations have 
failed to converge on "reasonable commercial terms."  How that misconception was propagated 
is unclear. 
Article 31, subparagraph (f), also stipulated that compulsory licenses be authorized 
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use."   For 
most of the world's least-developed nations, this provision posed a special difficulty in such areas 
as pharmaceuticals, since those nations typically had neither the technical capabilities nor 
sufficient demand to support efficient domestic drug production under license.  The problem was 
singled out as critical at the start of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2002, and in 2003, 
agreement was reached on amendments allowing waivers from subparagraph (f) for least-
developed nations and for other nations showing that they lack the capacity to manufacturing 
particular pharmaceutical products.
109
  To the best of the author's knowledge, the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS 
agreement have been implemented sparingly, if at all.  But their use has been threatened 
frequently to induce, especially from multinational pharmaceutical companies, substantial 
product price concessions or, e.g. in Brazil, voluntary licensing to domestic suppliers at modest 
                                                                                                                                             
(May 1996), pp. 181-186; with Edson Kondo, "The Effect of Patent Protection on Foreign Direct Investment," 
Journal of World Trade, vol. 29 (December 1995), pp. 97-122, along with note 98 supra.  See also Keith E. Maskus, 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International Economics: 2000), Chapter 5. 
109.  WTO document IP/C/W/405, 28 August 2003. 
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royalties.  Indeed, even the United States threatened compulsory licensing in 2001 to elicit 
substantial price reductions from Bayer AG of Germany on the drug Cipro when terrorist activity 





In many contemporary discussions of patent policy, and even in this paper, the term 
"intellectual property" trips off the tongue as if it were implanted in the human brain's genetically 
inherited grammar.  It is certainly a magical phrase.  "Patents" and "copyrights" are words with 
little or no appeal to the moral sensibilities.  But "intellectual property!"  What right-thinking 
person could be against property?  And who among the scribbling professions could not be all 
the more entranced when the property is intellectual?  
  What strikes a scholar who has been studying patent questions for more than a half 
century is that the phrase "intellectual property" was almost never heard during the 1950s and 
1960s.  None of the O'Mahoney Committee's 28 commissioned titles exploring the history, 
implementation, and economic consequences of the patent system during the late 1950s contains 
the term.  A search of the two most comprehensively bibliographic of the O'Mahoney Committee 
studies and a later Joint Economic Committee study reveals very few titles, mostly ancient, using 
the term.
110  It repays effort therefore to investigate how the phrase achieved common currency. 
  At first, "property" appears to have entered the literature without its "intellectual" 
modifier.  Patent-like privileges were given out by sovereigns in the period of late feudalism, and 
in the revolutions against feudalism and royal fiat, some acceptable substitute for "privilege" had 
to be invented.  The U.S. Constitution referred to "exclusive rights," but in Europe at the end of 
the 18th Century, it was de rigeur to refer to a creator's rights in inventions and artistic creations 
as "property."  The usage was not without controversy.  In their survey of French antecedents, 
Machlup and Penrose observe that "those who started using the word property in connection with 
invention had a very definite purpose in mind:  they wanted to substitute a word with a 
                                            
110.  Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study no. 15 of the Subcommittee on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1958); Julius W. Allen, Economic Aspects of 
Patents and the American Patent System  -- A Bibliography, Study No. 14 of the committee; and S. C. Gilfillan, 
Invention and the Patent System, Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress (1964). 
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respectable connotation, 'property,' for a word that had an unpleasant ring, 'privilege.'  This was a 
very deliberate choice on the part of politicians working for the adoption of a patent law in the 
French Constitutional Assembly."
111   The property construction was rejected by America's first 
federal patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, who wrote flatly that "Inventions cannot in nature be 
a subject of property."
112  Nevertheless, the property concept proved to be durable, and the first 
world-wide patent treaty, in 1883, was called the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property. 
  "Intellectual" was added to "property" much later.  The earliest known printed use of the 
term is in an obscure Massachusetts federal circuit court ruling.
113  It appears four times in 
French and German works from the 1860s cited in Machlup's bibliography, mostly addressed to 
the attack on patent systems being waged in Europe at the time.
114  Its next recorded appearance 
in American literature titles, gleaned from a search of three research library catalogs, was in a 
collection of essays by N.S. Shale in 1878.
115  It them reappears, according to the compendium 
by Julius Allen,
116 in the titles of three articles published between 1944 and 1952 in the house 
organ of the U.S. Patent Office, The Journal of the Patent Office Society.  A published lecture by 
Sir Arnold Plant titled The New Commerce in Ideas and Intellectual Property followed in 
1953.
117
                                            
111.  Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic 
History, vol. 10 (May 1950), p. 16.  See also Machlup, An Economic Review, p. 22. 
112.  John P. Foley, ed., The Jefferson Cyclopedia (Funk & Wagnalls: 1900), p. 728 (letter to Isaac McPherson in 
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McPherson reproduced at p. 433. 
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the term, Judge Woodbury cites a Supreme Court decision, Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832), but nowhere in 
that decision is the phrase "intellectual property" found. 
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  The phrase's takeoff into widespread use may have been associated with the creation of 
the Geneva-based World Intellectual Property Association (WIPO) in 1966 and its predecessor, 
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, founded in 1963.  Few 
intervening references could be found in bibliographies and library catalogs.  A seminal role in 
establishing those organizations was played by Arpad Bogsch, who before their formation was a 
legal counselor at the U.S. Copyright Office.  Obituaries at the time of his death in 2004 called 
him "the founding father of modern intellectual property" and "the creator of the modern 
intellectual property system."
118  None of the six books, all on copyright, written by Bogsch 
before 1966 and listed in the Harvard University catalog, included the words "intellectual 
property" in their title, but he appears to have been an important contributor to their acceptance 
in popular discourse.   
  Other organizations followed suit during the period when the U.S. patent policy reform 
movement was at its peak.  The American Patent Law Association changed its name to American 
Intellectual Property Law Association and made a corresponding change in the name of its 
journal (now AIPLA Quarterly Journal) in 1983 or 1984.  The relevant section of the American 
Bar Association was still named the Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law in 1987, but 
it then changed its name to Section on Intellectual Property Law and in 1993 renamed its 
quarterly newsletter the IPL Newsletter in place of PTC
119 Newsletter. It sponsored a conference 
on "Industrial and Intellectual Property: The Antitrust Interface," in October 1984.   The 
Intellectual Property Journal was initiated in 1984.  During the early 1980s the office of the U.S. 
President's Special Trade Representative created a new position, Assistant USTR for 
International Investment and Intellectual Property.
120  The industry lobbying group formed in 
1986 to influence deliberations under the Uruguay Round was called the Intellectual Property 
Committee.  In 1989 a revived subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on the Judiciary was named the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice.  In 1994 the U.S. Senate still had a Subcommittee on Patents, 
                                            
118.  Obituaries published on the worldwide web by the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property and the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers.  See also Ryan, Knowledge 
Diplomacy, p. 126. 
119.  I.e., Patent, Trademark, and Copyright.
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Copyrights, and Trademarks.  It was dissolved in 1995 and reborn in 2005 as the Intellectual 
Property Subcommittee. 
  Semantics are not policy.  But they undoubtedly influence policy-making as well as being 
influenced by it.  The growing use of the term "intellectual property" to describe patent and 
trademark matters probably contributed to the emergence of a favorable mind set that in turn set 




  U.S. patent policy was altered in significant ways during the 1970s and 1980s through 
legislatative, administrative, and judicial actions.  Some of the legislative changes were well-
grounded in objective analyses of the problems at hand and what could be accomplished; others, 
and in particular the centralization of patent appeals in a Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, were not.  In most cases, the parties with the strongest vested interest in new legislation 
got what they wanted -- most generally, with the exception of the generic drug provisions in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, a strengthening of the role patents play in American industrial life.  The 
patent law profession in particular thrived.  But the changes brought negative consequences 
along with the positive.  In particular, by encouraging the proliferation of patents covering 
inventions of dubious novelty and increasing the statistical probability that knowing or 
inadvertent infringement of patents leads to dire consequences, it increased the risks as well as 
the rewards from inventive activity.  It is far from clear that the positive effects outweigh the the 
negatives.  Fortunately, as economic studies have shown repeatedly, patents do not play a 
particularly important role in most fields of industrial innovation, and equally fortunately, those 
who advise industrial leaders in their journeys through the patent minefield are adept at 
negotiating solutions that in most instances avoid serious impediments to the pace of 
technological progress.  It is nevertheless useful to assess the negatives and attempt to correct 
them through legislative or judicial action.  In this, we would be emulating the example of one of 
the world's most famous inventors, James Watt, who observed "I have been trying experiments 
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on the reciprocating engine, and have made some alterations for the better and some for the 
worse, which latter must return to their former form."
121
  The world patent policy environment experienced even more dramatic change.  The 
harmonization demanded by first-world pharmaceutical makers and media-oriented enterprises 
was advanced significantly with the inclusion of TRIPS provisions in the Uruguay Round Treaty.  
Third-world nations were arguably disadvantaged by the changes, or at least, most considered 
themselves to be, but they accepted the bargain in the hope of better export prospects in 
agriculture and textiles and to ward off punitive measures under U.S. Trade Act Section 301.  
Because the textile and especially agricultural changes have at best been slow in coming,
122 it 
would not be improper to suggest that the third-world nations were led into a Faustian bargain.  
In Europe, on the other hand, competition policy authorities have become noticeably more 
aggressive, among other things requiring what amounts to the compulsory licensing of 
Microsoft's server-desktop communication protocol specifications and other proprietary 
information at royalty rates kept reasonable through Commission supervision. 
  We conclude by itemizing briefly some of the most important possibilities for improved 
policies, among other things guiding the European Community in its continuing efforts to 
establish a community-wide patent code.  Their merits have been debated at length elsewhere,
123 
so they will be presented here as mere recommendations with minimal accompanying analysis: 
 
1)  To purge the landscape of spurious and invalid patents that lead mainly to blackmail 
and/or costly litigation, a system of third-party opposition should be inaugurated in the 
United States.  It would be similar to the opposition systems enforced in many Western 
European nations.  Filing of an opposition by an interested party could commence at the 
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time patent applications are first published, e.g., 18 months after application, rather than 
waiting until patents have issued. 
2)  So-called "patent trolls" -- i.e., entrepreneurs who acquire patents merely to use them 
as instruments of blackmail rather than developing the underlying inventions and 
introducing them commercially -- should never be allowed to obtain injunctions against 
others who are actually developing the subject matter and utilizing it commercially.   
Rather, if the subject patents are shown to be valid and infringed, the non-
commercializing patent holders should be limited to recovering reasonable royalties.   
Ideally, the royalties would be set by arbitration rather than being subject to the caprices 
of a jury decision. 
3)  In other cases, when acceptable substitutes for an infringed product or process exist, 
and given the great difficulty of estimating damages under a "lost profits" standard, 
damages should be limited to reasonable royalties. 
4)  Companies that acquire dominant patent positions in meaningful markets through the 
acquisition of patents from inventors whose R&D they did not support financially should 
be consisdered to have monopolized in the antitrust sense and subjected to compulsory 
licensing remedies, unless they can show that the persons from whom they acquired the 
patents could not have commercialized the inventions independently. 
5)  Inventions resulting from research efforts supported in substantial measure by 
government funds should continue to be licensed for commercialization to private parties, 
as authorized under the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts.  However, when such 
licenses are exclusive, as they may need to be to encourage commercialization, but when 
the resulting products are priced at levels out of all proportion to the costs and risks 
undertaken by the commercializing enterprise, the march-in rights embodied in those 
Acts should excercised.  A rule of reason should be applied in judging both the necessity 
of remedies and their extent.  Since this is difficult, the U.S. federal government should 
create a commission whose task is to determine and recommend remedies sufficient to 
correct abuses of government-supported patents. 
6)  Clarification from either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress is needed on a matter 
the Supreme Court elected not to hear on appeal after the government antitrust agencies 
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filed conflicting briefs.
124   A decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
permitted a patent holder to pay $60 million to a would-be generic competitor to delay 
generic entry into a prescription drug market when, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
generic firm could have entered following expiration of the period when entry had to be 
delayed because of a patent dispute.  
7)  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a fait accompli unlikely to be 
eliminated.  However, the Supreme Court should be diligent in accepting certiorari on its 
decisions and reversing those that operate to the detriment of balanced technological 
progress.  The U.S. President should take seriously the will of Congress that "a broad 
range of qualified individuals" be appointed to the Court, nominating relatively fewer 
individuals who have made their living through the practice of patent law and nominating 
instead individuals with professional backgrounds in technological research and the 
economics of technological innovation. 
8)  The so-called "research exemption," whose status in U.S. law has been questioned, 
should be affirmed.  That is, patents should not enforceable to block the application of a 
technology purely for purposes of research and development, especially when the 
research is done by not-for-profit organizations.  Only when research has progressed to 
the point at which products or products are commercized should patent protection have 
exclusionary power or be used to levy tolls on the advance of technology. 
9)  Some of the impediments to economic development and health care programs in less-
developed nations as a result of the Uruguay Round Treaty have been alleviated by 
provisions delaying implementation of patent law changes for the least-developed nations 
until 2016, by the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS agreement, and by the 
Doha-Cancun interpretation allowing compulsory licensing for importation of e.g. 
pharmaceuticals by nations unable to produce under compulsory license for their own 
use.  The developed nations, however, should cease their opposition to full utilization of 
these exceptions and recognize that compulsory licensing is a fully acceptable measure 
under appropriate conditions. 
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10)  A skeptical view should be taken by the U.S. Congress and the parliaments of other 
nations toward the patentability of business methods, computer programs, natural 
processes that operate within the human body, surgical methods, and human DNA 
sequences and the proteins they express.  To the extent that the development and 
commercialization of medicines, vaccines, and therapeutic methods comes into conflict 
with such patents and also with patents on research tools, injunctive remedies should 
normally be unavailable.  When voluntary agreement on licenses or cross-licenses at 
mutually acceptable royalties cannot be reached, stalemates should be eliminated by 
determining reasonable royalties through arbitration. 
 
   